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Recent research with several species of nonhuman primates suggests sophisticated motor-planning
abilities observed in human adults may be ubiquitous among primates. However, there is considerable
variability in the extent to which these abilities are expressed across primate species. In the present
experiment, we explore whether the variability in the expression of anticipatory motor-planning abilities
may be attributed to cognitive differences (such as tool use abilities) or whether they may be due to the
consequences of morphological differences (such as being able to deploy a precision grasp). We
compared two species of New World monkeys that differ in their tool use abilities and manual dexterity:
squirrel monkeys, Saimiri sciureus (less dexterous with little evidence for tool use) and tufted capuchins,
Sapajus apella (more dexterous and known tool users). The monkeys were presented with baited cups in
an untrained food extraction task. Consistent with the morphological constraint hypothesis, squirrel
monkeys frequently showed second-order motor planning by inverting their grasp when picking up an
inverted cup, while capuchins frequently deployed canonical upright grasping postures. Findings suggest
that the lack of ability for precision grasping may elicit more consistent second-order motor planning, as
the squirrel monkeys (and other species that have shown a high rate of second-order planning) have
fewer means of compensating for inefﬁcient initial postures. Thus, the interface between morphology
and motor planning likely represents an important factor for understanding both the ontogenetic and
phylogenetic origins of sophisticated motor-planning abilities.
 2013 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
How individuals interact with objects in their environment can
yield valuable insights into the psychological control of behaviour
(Rosenbaum et al. 2012). In nonhuman primates (hereafter pri-
mates), much of the research in this domain has focused exclusively
on tool use, an ability that is restricted to a handful of species (see
Tomasello & Call 1997). However, seemingly mundane motor ac-
tions, such as reaching for and picking up an object, are often
guided by an anticipation of upcoming postural and task demands
(e.g. Rosenbaum et al. 1990). The paradigmatic example of this is
the observation that when a person turns over an upside down
glass to ﬁll it with water, he or she typically reaches for the glass
with a thumb-down grip that affords a more controlled subsequent
posture when ﬁlling it (e.g. Rosenbaum et al. 1990). This grip choice
at the beginning of the motor sequence reﬂects planning to
accommodate the later postural demands entailed by ﬁlling the
glass, arguably the element requiring the most precision. The
cognitive abilities required to achieve this type of anticipatory
planning have been postulated to act as a scaffold for the emer-
gence of more sophisticated cognitive abilities such as tool use
(Johnson-Frey 2004) and longer-term planning (van Swieten et al.
2010; Keen 2011). Thus, understanding the ontogenetic and
phylogenetic roots of motor planning may yield insights regarding
the foundation of higher-order cognitive functioning.
In humans, the onset of motor planning is apparent during the
early stages of infancy and then develops gradually throughout
childhood. Very young infants are capable of adjusting their grip
selection when reaching for objects of different sizes and orienta-
tions (e.g. Lockman et al. 1984; Newell et al. 1989). By around 10
months of age, infants are capable of more sophisticated motor
planning, such as adjusting the speed of approach to grasping an
object depending on precision requirements of the task (Claxton
et al. 2003). From age 3 years onward, children continue to reﬁne
their motor-planning abilities. Remarkably, however, differences
between children and adults in motor-planning behaviour persist
even later in childhood. In particular, children appear delayed with
respect to the capacity to alter their object manipulation not just on
the basis of immediate task demands, but on the next task to be
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performed. This ability, termed second-order motor planning
(Rosenbaum et al. 2012), is evident in the inverted glass example
described above. In turning over the glass, a person initially adopts
an awkward object grasp because it ensures a more comfortable
posture following rotation. Surprisingly, the ability to engage in this
type of second-order motor planning is not consistently demon-
strated by children until after their 10th birthday (Adalbjornsson
et al. 2008; Thibaut & Toussaint 2010; Weigelt & Schack 2010;
Jongbloed-Pereboom et al. 2013; K. Wunsch, D. Weiss, T. Schack &
M. Weigelt, unpublished data; reviewed in Rosenbaum et al. 2012).
In contrast to the abundant research conductedwith humans on
motor planning, far fewer studies have investigated similar effects
in primates. Initial studies of motor planning in monkeys suggest
that the most rudimentary abilities appear to be conserved across
species. For example, both neurophysiological and behavioural
measures have provided evidence that, like young human infants,
primates are capable of adapting their grip selection based on the
physical affordances of the objects to be grasped (e.g. Gardner et al.
1999). More recently, several studies have begun to explore
whether primates show second-order anticipatory motor-planning
abilities similar to those observed in human adults. In an initial
study, Weiss et al. (2007) presented cottontop tamarins, Saguinus
oedipus, a non-tool-using species of New World monkey, with a
food reward placed inside of a cup suspended in either an upright
or inverted orientation. When the cup was in the upright orienta-
tion, all of the monkeys took hold of it with a canonical thumb-up
grasping posture to extract the food. However, when the cup was
inverted, the tamarins behaved like human adults do, adopting an
inverted thumb-down grasping posture. Thus, without any explicit
training, the monkeys demonstrated signiﬁcant motor-planning
skills by inhibiting their natural grasping tendencies and adopting
an unusual grasping posture to accommodate a subsequent task
demand. This ﬁnding was later replicated with several species of
lemurs, the most evolutionarily distant living primate relatives of
humans and also non-tool-users (Chapman et al. 2010). Together,
these ﬁndings suggest humankind’s second-order motor-planning
abilities may have lengthy evolutionary roots, evidenced even in
non-tool-using species.
The ubiquity of motor planning abilities in primates has been
further attested in OldWorld monkeys and great apes. Nelson et al.
(2011) studied rhesus monkeys, Macaca mulatta, using a spoon-
reaching task that was adapted from a study conducted with hu-
man infants (McCarty et al. 1999). The monkeys were presented
with a spoon containing food resting on a stand that encouraged
subjects to grasp the handle to initiate transport. Three out of seven
monkeys alternated their reaching hand to bring the bowl of the
spoon to their mouth efﬁciently (similar to the performance of 19-
month-old human infants; McCarty et al. 1999). Another three
monkeys changed their posture to accommodate an efﬁcient grasp
with the preferred hand on each trial. These strategies suggest that
rhesus monkeys are capable of some degree of anticipatory motor
planning. Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, the only great ape to be
tested thus far, have also demonstrated second-order motor plan-
ning in the context of a tool use task (Frey & Povinelli 2012). In
summary, there is converging evidence from several experiments
employing different methodologies that sophisticated motor-
planning abilities are shared among primates and were likely
characteristic of the ancestral primate species.
Despite the growing evidence for anticipatory motor-planning
abilities in primates, there is considerable variability in perfor-
mance across species. While cottontop tamarins and lemurs were
fairly uniform in showing second-order motor planning in the
context of the cup task (all tamarins tested showed the effect, and
10 out of 14 lemurs tested in a less well-controlled environment
showed the effect), rhesus monkeys did not consistently
demonstrate this effect when presented with an analogous cup task
(only two out of nine subjects tested; E. L. Nelson, personal
communication). Furthermore, very few chimpanzees studied by
Frey & Povinelli (2012) adopted grasping postures that anticipated
future task demands in the context of the initial self-directed task
reported by the authors (bringing a tool baited with food on one
side to their mouth). As noted above, human children up to 10 years
of age are also variable in how they select their grasping postures in
similar tasks (e.g. dowel transport; Rosenbaum et al. 1990), using a
wide variety of strategies that do not seem to conform to the
principle of second-order motor planning (e.g. Adalbjornsson et al.
2008).
From a cognitive perspective, this pattern of results is somewhat
surprising. The species that more uniformly demonstrate second-
order planning are thought to be non-tool-using species (Jolly
1964; Santos et al. 2005), whereas the species that are less
consistent all share a capacity for tool use to varying degrees (e.g.
Ottoni & Izar 2008; Sanz & Morgan 2010; Macellini et al. 2012).
Despite the fact that sophisticated motor-planning abilities are not
a sufﬁcient condition for the emergence of tool use (Weiss et al.
2007; Chapman et al. 2010; Frey & Povinelli 2012), a priori one
might expect that tool-using species would consistently demon-
strate sophisticated motor-planning abilities when interacting with
objects. From a morphological perspective, it is similarly counter-
intuitive that the species characterized by limited manual dexterity
appear to demonstrate second-order motor-planning abilities more
consistently. Lemurs, and prosimians more generally, are unable to
independently ﬂex or extend individual digits, as they lack the
capacity for hand-internal positioning (MacNeilage 1991). Thus,
like tamarins, lemurs are restricted to using a whole hand ‘power
grip’ (Napier 1960; MacNeilage 1991). By contrast, primate species
(including human children) that are more variable in expressing
motor-planning abilities are all capable of precision grips in which
objects can be grasped between the ﬁnger (or ﬁngers) and thumb
(Napier 1960; Costello & Fragaszy 1988; Spinozzi et al. 2004).
We propose that this latter observation regarding morpholog-
ical constraints may explain much of the variance in performance
observed across experiments involving different primate species. In
motor planning, the extended motor system is posited to predict
sensory consequences prior to experiencing actual sensory feed-
back (Wolpert & Ghahramani 2000; Frey & Povinelli 2012). It fol-
lows that the costs for adopting a grasp that does not accommodate
future postures may be greater for species with limited means of
subsequent compensation (due to a lack of dexterity and limited
grasping postures). Thus, forgoing second-order motor planning
could result in unfavourable consequences with respect to effort or
comfort (along the lines of Short & Cauraugh 1999; Frey & Povinelli
2012) relative to species possessing greater manual dexterity. Thus,
species capable of exercising precision grips may be able to devise
numerous strategies to compensate for adopting a suboptimal
initial grasping posture. This assertion is consistent with the vari-
able strategies used by chimpanzees and children in the context of
self-directed motor-planning tasks (e.g. Frey & Povinelli 2012; M. G.
Fischman, unpublished data).
Consequently, in the present study we sought to collect data on
second-order motor planning from additional primate species. We
presented a cup task to two primate species that differ in their
manual dexterity. Squirrel monkeys, Saimiri sciureus, and tufted
capuchin monkeys, Sapajus apella, are closely related New World
monkeys belonging to the family Cebidae. In a study comparing
prehensive grips in four NewWorld monkey species, Welles (1976)
reported that capuchins show greater control in gripping than
squirrel monkeys. This report is consistent with a later study that
observed capuchins using precision grips while grasping small
objects, whereas squirrel monkeys did not (Costello & Fragaszy
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1988). Relatedly, perhaps, capuchins are known to routinely use
tools in thewild and in captivity (see Fragaszy et al. 2004), whereas,
to the best of our knowledge, there is only scant evidence for tool
use in squirrel monkeys (see Buckmaster et al. 2012). Given the
aforementioned studies indicating that sophisticated motor-
planning abilities are ubiquitous in primate species (Weiss et al.
2007; Chapman et al. 2010; Frey & Povinelli 2012), we anticipated
that both capuchins and squirrel monkeys would be capable of
demonstrating second-order motor planning by inverting their
grasping posture when turning over an upside down cup to extract
food from within. If it is the case that morphology constrains the
expression of motor-planning abilities, then one might expect to
observe the species with the more limited grasping abilities
(squirrel monkeys) to show second-order motor planning more
consistently relative to the species with greater degrees of freedom
in grasping postures (capuchins). Conversely, if the cognitive-
planning abilities indexed by second-order motor planning are
related to those necessary for tool use (Johnson-Frey 2004), one
might expect the capuchins to be more consistent in their use of
inverted grasping postures than squirrel monkeys.
METHODS
Subjects and Housing
Six adult squirrel monkeys were tested (two males, four fe-
males). Those with known birth dates ranged in age from 14 to 19
years old. Two others were adults estimated to be 14 years old. The
monkeys were born in captivity and housed together in a social
group at Bucknell University in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
since 2008. The monkeys were housed in an indoor/outdoor
enclosure. Ten capuchin monkeys (three males, seven females)
from a social group of 14 animals were also tested at Bucknell
University. Nine were adults ranging in age from 4 to 17 years old
and one was a 2-year-old juvenile. All monkeys were born in
captivity and were either founding members of the colony estab-
lished in 2000 or born into the group. The capuchin monkeys were
housed in a large indoor enclosure. Both enclosures were outﬁtted
with shelves, perches, climbing structures and swings to promote
naturalistic movement. Enrichment devices were continually
available. Food and water were available ad libitum. All monkeys
except one had participated in prior experiments that involved
grasping or manipulation of objects, although none of the previous
studies involved exposure to the objects or the apparatus used in
this study.
Apparatus
An apparatus for suspending a small plastic cup was modelled
after the one used by Weiss et al. (2007). As in the previous study,
the apparatus was designed to hold a stemmed cup in either an
upright or inverted position at the same height relative to amonkey
and encourage subjects to extract the cup only by grabbing the
stem. The squirrel monkey apparatus was constructed of wood
(20.3  6.4  1.3 cm) and had a platform (5.1  5.1 cm) attached to
its centre. On the platform, there were two horizontal metal rods
(1.3 cm) protruding horizontally (see Fig. 1a). On the back of the
apparatus, there were bolts that could be afﬁxed to wire caging
with wing nuts, thereby suspending the apparatus in either
orientation. The cup used in the experiment was a transparent
plastic champagne glass with the base removed and the handle
extended with wood and tape (resulting in a cup that was 7.6 cm
tall and 0.6 cm thick with a 5.1 cm diameter mouth; see Fig. 1b).
The capuchin apparatus was identical in almost all respects
except that it was scaled to accommodate their larger body and
hand size. The apparatus was 30.5  12.7  1.3 cm with a
12.7  8.9 cm central platform. The metal horizontal bars were
5.1 cm long and 5.1 cm apart, protruding 6.4 cm from the appa-
ratus. The top or bottom of the apparatus could be afﬁxed to ametal
shelf in the enclosure to provide both upright and inverted orien-
tations for the cup. The transparent plastic cup used with the ca-
puchins was 12.7 cm tall with a mouth that was 8.9 cm in diameter.
The stem was 7.6 cm long and 1.3 cm thick (see Fig. 1c).
Procedure
Subjects were separated from their group for testing by moving
them into a small transport box or a subcompartment of their
enclosure dedicated for testing. Depending on the phase of testing
(see below), animals were presented with the cup resting on a
Figure 1. Squirrel monkey (a) apparatus and (b) cup. Capuchin (c) apparatus and cup.
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horizontal surface or placed within the apparatus described above.
Squirrel monkey cups were baited with half of a miniature
marshmallow. Preliminary testing showed that, unlike the squirrel
monkeys, the capuchins used their hands to extract a miniature
marshmallow out of the cup without turning the cup upright.
Therefore, capuchin cups were instead baited with a small amount
of marshmallow ﬂuff. This required the capuchins to rotate the cup
to an upright position and use their mouth to extract the food
reward from the cup, which was more analogous to the actions of
the squirrel monkeys with the miniature marshmallows.
Familiarization
Since the monkeys had no experience acquiring food rewards
from a transparent container, we familiarized them with the cups
prior to testing (similar to Weiss et al. 2007). Each animal received
four stages of familiarization in which they could grasp the cup in
any manner they chose and remove the food afﬁxed to the inside of
the bowl. At the start of each familiarization trial, the experimenter
waited until the subject was attending and then baited the cup. In
the ﬁrst stage of familiarization, the experimenter held the baited
cup by the stemwith the opening facing the subject. If the monkey
grasped the cup, the experimenter let go and allowed the monkey
to extract the food. In the second stage of familiarization, the
experimenter placed the cup on its side on a horizontal surface
inside the enclosure with the opening of the cup facing the subject.
In the third step of familiarization, the cup was placed on its side
facing 90 away from the monkey. In the fourth step of familiar-
ization, the cup was placed on its side with the bowl facing 180
away from the monkey. If the marshmallow was extracted suc-
cessfully, the animal was immediately advanced to the next step in
familiarization. After all steps of familiarization were completed,
subjects progressed to testing. If a monkey failed to respond at any
time during familiarization or testing, the trial was terminated and
that subject resumed at the same point in the sequence on the next
testing day.
Testing
All monkeys underwent three test phases. The ﬁrst test phase
included two trials in which the cup was placed in an inverted
orientation on a ﬂat surface within the monkey’s enclosure. The
second test phase included two trials in which the cup was sus-
pended in the upright position in the apparatus described above. In
the third test phase, the apparatus was rotated 180 and monkeys
received two trials with the cup supported in the inverted orien-
tation by the platform of the apparatus. Experimenters noted the
orientation of the monkey’s hand (thumb-up or thumb-down)
while grasping the stem in either the upright or inverted posi-
tion. All trials were digitally ﬁlmed for ofﬂine analysis.
Supplemental trials
If a monkey did not show second-order motor planning in the
ﬁrst set of test trials, we provided 12 supplemental trials across 3
testing days to see whether they would begin to demonstrate the
effect with increased exposure to the task. Monkeys received two
upright and two inverted trials per day in a randomized order. We
used a cup with the same dimensions as before, but tapered the tip
of the stem such that it would ﬁt into a hole in the shelving within
the monkey’s enclosure. This allowed the cup to stand upright on
the testing surface without the use of the apparatus.
Ethical Note
Research adhered to the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory
Animals (NRC 2011) and was approved by the Bucknell University
IACUC (protocol PGJ-06). Animals participated voluntarily and did
not undergo any stress while they were separated for testing.
Outside of the testing situation, the only stress the animals may
have experienced was that typical of primates living in hierarchical
social groups.
RESULTS
Squirrel Monkeys
All six subjects completed the four familiarization phases as well
as the three test phases. The monkeys either used a one-handed
grasp on the stem of the cup or a two-handed grasp on the bowl.
The one-handed grasps on the stem consisted of either a thumb-up
or thumb-down hand orientation, whereas the two-handed grasps
on the bowl were always thumb-up. One subject never grasped the
stem during any of the test phases (she used a two-handed grasp on
the bowl in both upright and inverted trials) and she consistently
appeared agitated when given the task. Since our behavioural
measure involved grasping by the stem of the cup, we excluded her
from the analysis. When the cup was inverted on a ﬂat surface
within the enclosure, four of the ﬁve remaining subjects used a
thumb-down grasp on the ﬁrst trial. On the second trial, all ﬁve
monkeys used a thumb-down grasp. In summary, during the ﬁrst
two trials, nine out of 10 times, the monkeys used an inverted
grasping posture. By contrast, when the cup was placed in an up-
right orientation within the apparatus, all monkeys adopted the
canonical thumb-up grasping posture with either one or both
hands for both trials (Fig. 2).
When the apparatus was turned over and the cup was inverted,
all subjects but one managed to remove the cup by grasping the
bowlwith both hands; therefore, we did not analyse these data. The
one monkey that did grasp the cup by its stem adopted a thumb-
down grasping posture in both trials of this test phase.
Capuchin Monkeys
In the ﬁrst test phase, when the cupwas inverted on the shelf, all
monkeys used a one-handed grasp on the stem in either an upright
or inverted orientation. Three of the 10 monkeys adopted a thumb-
down grasping posture on the stem in the ﬁrst trial. In the second
trial, again three out of 10 monkeys adopted the thumb-down
grasping posture, although only two monkeys used a thumb-
down grasp in both trials. Overall, in the ﬁrst two inverted cup
trials, the capuchinmonkeys used an inverted grasp on six out of 20
total trials. In the second test phase, when the cup was upright in
the apparatus, all 10 monkeys grasped the cup using the canonical
thumb-up grasping posture with either one hand on the stem or
both hands on the bowl in all trials (Fig. 3). In the third test phase in
which the cup was inverted within the apparatus, none of the ca-
puchins inverted their grasp as they removed the cup. Of the 20
trials, 17 were one-handed upright grasps on the stem and three
were two-handed grasps on the bowl. Throughout all test phases, if
the monkeys did not grasp the cup in the most efﬁcient manner,
they would correct that grip with the aid of the other hand at some
point prior to acquiring the reward and dropping the cup.
Given that only four out of 10 capuchins ever inverted their
grasping posture, we provided the capuchins with three supple-
mental days of testing consisting of two upright and two inverted
trials each day. The capuchins inverted their grasp in 30% of the
total trials on their ﬁrst day of testing (trials 1 and 2). The capuchins
inverted their grasps in 20%, 10% and 25% of the total trials on
supplemental days 1, 2 and 3, respectively (trials 3e8; Fig. 4).
Notably, the only individuals that adopted thumb-down grasping
postures during the supplemental testing days were the ones that
already did so in the initial trials. Therefore, we saw no evidence of
S. L. Zander et al. / Animal Behaviour 86 (2013) 1251e12581254
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individuals learning to use inverted grips over the course of the
experiment.
Overall, six of the 10 capuchins never adopted a thumb-down
grasping posture during the course of the study. Of the remaining
four subjects, one monkey inverted her grasp on all eight inverted
cup trials, one inverted her grasp four times, one inverted her grasp
three times, and one inverted her grasp twice. In summary, the
capuchins used a thumb-down grasp in only 21% of the total trials
when the cup was inverted on the shelf.
We used a z test for proportions to determine whether the
number of individuals showing second-order motor planning
throughout all of the experiments was equivalent across species. To
keep the comparison equivalent across species, we compared only
the second test phase in which the subjects lifted the cup off of the
shelf (only the capuchins removed the inverted cup from the
apparatus using the stem, and never with an inverted grasp). As
noted earlier, all ﬁve squirrel monkeys showed the effect in at least
one trial, whereas four out of 10 capuchins showed the effect at
least once across all trials. This represented a signiﬁcant difference
between groups (P ¼ 0.026).
We appeared to have found a species difference if there were no
other underlying differences in our two subject populations that
could account for differences in performance. Two possibilities
were age, as young monkeys may have performed differently than
older monkeys, and the amount of research experience the animals
had manipulating or grasping objects. To assess this possibility, we
explored the relationship between the grasp used in the inverted
cup trials and the age and research experience of the animals
6
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Figure 3. Frequencies of capuchin grasping orientations as a function of whether the cup was upright or inverted. Frequencies indicate the ﬁrst two trials of each orientation pooled
across the 10 monkeys.
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Figure 2. Frequencies of grasping orientations used by squirrel monkeys as a function of whether the cup was in an upright or inverted position. The graph shows the ﬁrst two trials
of each orientation pooled across the ﬁve monkeys.
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(Table 1). As a group, the squirrel monkeys tended to be older than
the capuchins, so age might have accounted for the difference if
older monkeys tended to use a thumb-down grasp. However, the
three oldest capuchins never used a thumb-down grasp and those
capuchins that did were younger than the squirrel monkeys
(Table 1). The capuchin monkeys tended to have more research
experience involving grasping and manipulation, partly because
they participated in tool use studies (hammer and insertion tools)
of which the squirrel monkeys were incapable. Intuitively, one
might predict that more research involving manipulating or
grasping would promote more thumb-down grasps perhaps due to
extra experience. Indeed, two of the capuchin monkeys that used a
thumb-down grasp (De and Nw) did have the maximum amount of
research experience (Table 1). However, two others (Nt and Nk) had
the same amount of research experience and did not use a thumb-
down grasp. Furthermore, the squirrel monkeys generally tended
to have less research experience and all of them used a thumb-
down grasp. Taken together, differences in age and/or research
experience between the species did not appear to be systematically
related to use of an inverted grasp.
DISCUSSION
We sought to determine whether capuchin monkeys and
squirrel monkeys would show second-order motor planning as has
been demonstrated in tamarin monkeys (Weiss et al. 2007), lemurs
(Chapman et al. 2010) and chimpanzees (Frey & Povinelli 2012).
Furthermore, we were interested in determining whether the rate
at which second-order motor planning is expressed varies across
species that differ in cognitive abilities and manual dexterity.
Consequently, we presented the monkeys with the cup task used in
previous experiments (Weiss et al. 2007; Chapman et al. 2010). We
found that, as predicted, both species were capable of second-order
motor planning, as individuals from each species inverted their
grasping posture to turn over a plastic cup and extract food from
inside the bowl. This pattern of results provides further evidence
that second-order motor planning may be ubiquitous in primates,
and perhaps characteristic of the ancestral primate species
(Chapman et al. 2010). Interestingly, this effect was evidenced in all
squirrel monkeys tested (ﬁve), but in only four of 10 capuchin
monkeys (some sparingly) tested, despite many opportunities to do
so. Furthermore, the overall rate of inverting the grasping posture
for the capuchin monkeys was quite low even when provided with
additional trials. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis
that primates that are incapable of precision grasps and that seem
to have fewer degrees of freedomwith respect to manual dexterity
appear to demonstrate second-order motor-planning abilities more
consistently.
As noted above, while the evidence thus far suggests sophisti-
cated motor planning is ubiquitous in primates, there appears to be
considerable variability in the rate of expression across different
species and across development in humans. Interestingly, with the
exception of human adults, individuals who clearly express
advanced prospective planning abilities in the context of tool use
tend to be more variable in the extent to which they consistently
show second-order motor planning in experimental tasks. Our
ﬁndings with squirrel monkeys and capuchins mirror this pattern.
Less than half of the capuchins in our study inverted their grasp,
most at very low rates. Capuchins are known to plan prospectively
in the context of tool use (Visalberghi et al. 2009; Fragaszy et al.
2010a, b; Liu et al. 2011) and are capable of precision grasping
(Costello & Fragaszy 1988). Conversely, the squirrel monkeys
behaved more like the tamarin monkeys, in that all of the monkeys
tested demonstrated the effect. Like tamarins, squirrel monkeys
have limited manual dexterity (Costello & Fragaszy 1988) and, to
the best of our knowledge, there is only one account of squirrel
monkeys using tools (Buckmaster et al. 2012). This pattern of
ﬁndings can be better understood by means of a feed-forward in-
ternal model of the extended motor system (such as Wolpert et al.
1998; Frey & Povinelli 2012). If the task of the extended motor
system is to predict sensory outcomes prior to execution (see Frey &
Povinelli 2012), then it stands to reason that such computations
may be intimately tied to the morphological constraints of the
body. Thus, it is likely that the consequences for movements that
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Figure 4. Grasping posture frequencies for the 10 capuchin monkeys for the inverted
cup condition across all eight trials. : upright grasps; : inverted grasps.
Table 1
Sex and age of each subject indicating the outcome of the grasping task and
experimental experience
Species Subject Sex Age (years)* Outcomey Experiencez
Squirrel monkey Km F 19 þ B, G, R, T
Le M 15 þ B, T
Dg M 14 þ B
Db F w14 þ B, I, R, T
Hn F w14 þ B, R, T
Capuchin monkey Dv M 17  B, E, H, I, M, T
Mt M 17  B, H, I, M, T
Nt F 17  B, C, E, H, I, M, T
De F 11 þ B, C, E, H, I, M, T
Nk F 10  B, C, E, H, I, M, T
Nw F 9 þ B, C, E, H, I, M, T
Sc F 7 þ B, C, E, M
Sd F 6 þ B, C, E, M
Nb F 4  I
Sm M 2  d
* Birth dates of two squirrel monkeys were unknown, and ages are based on age
estimates at the time of their acquisition in 2000.
y A plus sign indicates that the animal used a thumb-down grasp on at least one of
the ﬁrst two inverted cup trials; a minus sign indicates that they did not use a
thumb-down grasp in either trial.
z Extent to which subjects previously participated in tasks involving manipula-
tion or grasping: B (bimanual task): animal receives a tube it can grasp in one hand
and remove food from with the other hand; C (cup rotation): involves horizontally
rotating a cup attached to a swivel to remove a reward from an opening that
originally faced away from the animal; E (exchange of token): animal grasps a metal
object from the experimenter and exchanges it for food; G (grasping task): animal
reaches around an opening in one side of a box to obtain a reward;H (hammer tool):
animal grasps a stone and uses it to crack open a walnut; I (insertion tool): animal
grasps a stick and inserts it into a tube to push out a reward;M (moving platform):
animal grasps vertical handles on a circular horizontal platform and pushes the
handle to rotate the platform and obtain rewards; R (rake tool): animal grasps a
stick with a rake-like end and pulls on the stick to receive a reward placed inside the
rake; T (touchscreen): involves a variety of cognitive tests (e.g. reversal learning)
requiring the animal to reach through its caging and manipulate a touchscreen.
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are inconsistent with second-order motor planning differ across
species that vary in their degree of manual dexterity. For example,
the costs for a chimpanzee to adopt a seemingly awkward ﬁnal
position while transporting food from the end of a dowel to its
mouth may be insufﬁcient to elicit modiﬁcation at the outset of a
motor sequence (Frey & Povinelli 2012). Conversely, for a species
with more limiting morphological constraints (with respect to
grasping or overall ﬂexibility), the costs of assuming analogous
postures may be much higher. This could result in more frequent
anticipatory modiﬁcations to motor sequences to better accom-
modate the later postural demands.
Interestingly, the apparatusmodelled from the previous tamarin
study (Weiss et al. 2007) was not effective for the squirrel monkeys
and yielded a different pattern of results for the capuchin monkeys.
The squirrel monkeys managed to extract the cup by grasping its
base and therefore the data could not be analysed (as the depen-
dent measure required subjects to grasp the stem). The capuchins,
however, did use the stem but did not invert their hands to extract
the cup. In the tamarin study, extracting the cup from the apparatus
resulted in greater uniformity in second-order motor planning
relative to when subjects picked up the cup from the ﬂoor. For the
capuchins, the opposite was true, as the only demonstrations of
second-order motor planning were observed in the context of the
less constrained task. These results further underscore the fact that
capuchins appear to show less second-order motor planning in the
cup task than other New World monkey species that have been
tested.
Our ﬁndings suggest several future avenues for research. One
issue that has yet to be addressed is the source of individual vari-
ation in second-order motor-planning abilities. For example, over
half of the capuchins never inverted their grasp to extract food from
the cup. It would be natural to wonder whether they behave
differently in other contexts involving planning or object manipu-
lations (such as tool use). Likewise, it would be of interest to
determine whether the expression of anticipatory motor-planning
abilities is correlated with other cognitive abilities such as inhibi-
tory control (which may be necessary to inhibit the canonical grasp
and adopt an usual grasping posture) or foresight (see Weiss et al.
2012). Given that there is individual variability in performance
across many species, understanding the source of variation may
lead to a better appreciation of howmotor planning interfaces with
other higher-order cognitive abilities such as long-term planning
and tool use. It would also be of interest to explore whether ca-
puchins, like the chimpanzees tested by Frey & Povinelli (2012),
would show second-order motor planning more consistently when
the costs of the task are high. For example, in humans, the precision
requirements of the task are important for the expression of end-
state comfort (e.g. Rosenbaum et al. 1996). Correspondingly,
when the precision requirements for the task are higher, capuchins
might show second-order motor planning with greater regularity.
A ﬁnal consideration is that our results suggest a future direction
for research to resolve the surprising developmental ﬁnding that
human children up to about age 10 years do not appear to engage
consistently in second-order motor planning to the same extent as
human adults (Adalbjornsson et al. 2008; Thibaut & Toussaint 2010;
Weigelt & Schack 2010; Jongbloed-Pereboom et al. 2013; K.
Wunsch, D. Weiss, T. Schack & M. Weigelt, unpublished data;
reviewed in Rosenbaum et al. 2012). It is possible that, similar to
primate species that are capable of precision grasping, human
children do not frequently invert their grasping posture when
turning over a glass because they can easily compensate later in the
motor sequence. This notion is consistent with the reports that the
children tend to adopt a variety of other strategies for engaging in
this task (e.g. Adalbjornsson et al. 2008; K. Wunsch, D. Weiss, T.
Schack &M.Weigelt, unpublished data). Notably, over the course of
development, children become more likely to use second-order
motor planning when reaching for objects, although adult-like
consistency is not evident even in children up to 10 years of age
(e.g. Thibaut & Toussaint 2010; Weigelt & Schack 2010; Jongbloed-
Pereboom et al. 2013; K. Wunsch, D. Weiss, T. Schack & M. Weigelt,
unpublished data). It is currently unknownwhy the developmental
trajectory for this ability in humans is so protracted. Our ﬁndings
suggest that it could be related to the physical changes associated
with maturation, as younger children may be more ﬂexible than
older children and adults. Alternatively, it could reﬂect changes in
cognitive abilities or sensory motor skills, as suggested elsewhere
(e.g. Wunsch et al., in press). One experiment that may help adju-
dicate between these accounts is to impose limitations to the de-
grees of freedom in grasping (such as by having subjects grasp
while wearing a mitten) and determine whether that elicits an
increase in second-order motor planning (as might be predicted by
the morphological constraint hypothesis). Note also that adult
humans tend to engage consistently in second-order motor plan-
ning when grasping objects (reviewed in Rosenbaum et al. 2012)
despite having sufﬁcient degrees of freedom to compensate for
suboptimal initial grasps (in particular, relative to other primate
species reviewed here). It is possible that the optimization of motor
actions in adults emerges not only due to changes in planning
abilities, but rather as a consequence of a constellation of factors,
including experience (e.g. weighted integration of multiple biases
(WIMB) model; Herbort & Butz 2012). Consequently, future
research with both humans and nonhumans will need to address
more precisely the underlying representations for anticipatory
motor-planning abilities and the causal factors that lead to their
emergence at both the individual and group level.
In summary, our study has provided further evidence that the
sophisticated motor-planning abilities observed in humans are
ubiquitous in primates and share a lengthy evolutionary history.
Given the current debate surrounding the idea that cognition may
also be rooted in the perceptual and motor systems (e.g. Adams
2010; Shapiro 2011; Letheby 2012), it is notable that the pattern
of results reported here offers a different type of connection be-
tween the body and mind. Our ﬁndings, in concert with other
motor-planning studies, suggest that the expression of motor-
planning capabilities may be impacted by the constraints
imposed by morphology, as the motor system may compute the
consequences for actions in relation to the limits imposed by
different biological designs.
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